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Richard L. Ground* 
Notwithstanding the enormous efforts made by the 
Latin American countries in the last five years to 
adjust their economies and despite the fact that the 
citizens of the developed nations are enjoying the 
benefits of the longest expansionary phase in the 
postwar period, the great majority of the peoples òf 
the region find themselves immersed in one of the 
most profound economic crises in their history. They 
are enduring simultaneously a severe external 
constraint; levels of production and employment 
substantially and increasingly below their trend 
values; and, in many cases, inflations of exceptional 
virulence, although since mid-1985, several 
countries have achieved spectacular advances 
towards price stabilization. 
In effect, the adjustment undergone by the Latin 
American countries has been unnecessarily costly 
and their recovery unduly and painfully slow. The 
markedly recessionary character of the adjustment 
suffered by the peoples of the region is chiefly the 
result of the acute scarcity of foreign finance. Hence 
the achievement of efficient adjustment and a timely 
and vigorous recovery largely depends on reforms of 
the lending policies of the international financial 
community that translate into a supply of credit in 
keeping with the impact of external shocks on deficit 
countries' balance of payments as well as with their 
capacity to absorb real falls in domestic expenditure 
without losses in production. On the other hand, the 
achievement of a more solid and autonomous 
development process means that Latin America 
must reduce its structural dependence on external 
financing, which depends, in turn, on the adoption of 
domestic policy reforms. 
•Staff member of the Economic Development 
Division of the Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean (ECLAC). A partial and preliminary 
version of this study, which was originally written in 
Spanish, was presented to the Seminar on Economic Crisis 
and Development Prospects in Latin America, organized 
by the National Development Council (CONADE), the Latin 
American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO) and the Latin 
American Institute forSocial Research (1LDIS) (Quito, 28 to 
31 July 1986). The author is grateful for the very valuable 
comments made by Adolfo Gurrieri on the preliminary 
version of this paper. He also thanks Raúl Pina for his 
efficient processing of text and statistical tables. The author 




The logic of the adjustment process is 
implacable, for it is rooted in a budgetary 
constraint: the impossibility of absorbing more 
goods and services than those available, 
including, of course, both those produced 
domestically and those acquired from abroad by 
means of factor income, foreign loans and 
domestic holdings of international reserves. The 
process is automatic as well as inevitable 
according as the gap between gross domestic 
expenditure and gross national income becomes 
untenable, i.e., when international reserves are 
exhausted and foreign lending, voluntary or 
otherwise, ceases.1 It entails the narrowing of 
the gap between gross domestic investment and 
gross national saving —or, what amounts to the 
same thing, the reduction of the deficit on the 
balance-of-payments current account— to an 
amount compatible with the availability of 
external finance. These being the inescapable 
facts of adjustment, the pertinent question is 
how to minimize their cost. 
The logic of the process is unconnected with 
the sources of disequilibria, whether the causes 
be domestic or external, transitory or 
permanent. Neither can it be counteracted by 
domestic economic policy. Nonetheless, the 
questions associated with the origin and 
duration of shocks are pertinent to the design of 
international adjustment policies, that is, they 
help to determine the optimum mix of foreign 
financing and domestic adjustment.2 Indeed, a 
deficit attributable to transitory external shocks 
should be financed for the sake of efficiency 
because the cost of eliminating a deficit 
ascribable to a temporary change in external 
conditions is generally much greater than the 
cost of sustaining it. 
1A condition implicit throughout this analysis. 
2
 By the term "shock" we mean phenomena such as the rise in 
the actual international interest rate, the fall in the actual average 
price of exports and retrenchment in the actual flow of credit from 
the international commercial banks in relation to their respective 
trend values. 
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The adjustment process imposes an 
inevitable cost, even in an economy free of 
imperfections; namely, the loss of welfare caused 
by the fall in absorption of goods and services 
involved in the elimination of a current account 
deficit, whatever the origin of the imbalance. In 
contrast, the cost of financing a deficit does 
depend on what type of shock has caused it. 
Thus, whereas the cost of postponing an 
inevitable adjustment —that is, of sustaining 
indefinitely a deficit provoked by domestic 
economic policies or permanent mutations in 
international market conditions— is always 
greater than the inevitable cost of adjustment, 
the cost of financing a deficit stemming from 
transitory external shocks is less than the 
inescapable welfare loss inherent in the 
elimination of the deficit. Consequently, 
adjustment to deficits caused by transitory 
external shocks, whether voluntary or forced by 
a lack of foreign finance, is inefficient and 
represents an overadjustment. 
Now, in economies free of imperfections 
—that is, in those that belong to the realm of the 
abstract— adjustment would not cause any 
production loss; in contrast, in real world 
economies, affected as they are by imperfections 
of varied type and intensity, a brusque and 
complete adjustment to the impact of any type of 
shock inevitably depresses the actual growth rate 
of economic activity vis-à-vis its potential rate 
when it does not reduce the actual level of gross 
domestic product.3 Therefore, although a 
current account deficit may be due to domestic 
!Two classes of imperfections may be identified. One 
comprises those inherent to the existence of time and uncertainty. 
The rigidities and lags they engender prevent instantaneous 
reallocations of productive resources in the directions and 
magnitudes required to maintain them fully utilized, even if the 
economy be free of structural and institutional defects and if 
domestic economic policies be those full employment requires. The 
other class embraces the structural and institutional imperfections 
policy shocks or permanent external ones, the 
minimization of welfare losses demands in 
addition a speed of adjustment consistent with 
the capacity of the imperfect economies of the 
real world to cope with falls in absorption 
without incurring losses in output.4 This 
requisite implies that the impact of permanent 
external and domestic policy shocks also should 
be partially and temporarily financed. Indeed, in 
the absence of an optimum mix of financing and 
adjustment of the balance-of-payments effects of 
shocks over time, not only will countries be 
forced to endure an overadjustment (when 
foreign finance does not cover the impact of 
transitory external shocks), but will also have to 
suffer needless welfare losses (when foreign 
finance ¡s insufficient to enable the countries to 
adjust without suffering production losses). 
Once again, without financing adjustment is 
inevitable, but adjustment in itself does not 
require production losses. Indeed, any output 
foregone during the process of adjustment is 
unnecessary and unjustified. 
Nonetheless, whether the international 
financial community will be willing to provide 
the essential resources to forestall a needlessly 
costly adjustment is quite another matter, even 
though in the past it often financed deficits 
which, on efficiency grounds, should have been 
eliminated. In practice, the criterion that has 
determined the magnitude, velocity and cost of 
the adjustment process that deficit Latin 
American countries have had to endure has not 
arisen from efficiency considerations. 
that arise over time as a result of flaws in domestic economic 
policies. This type of imperfection also blocks the full employment 
of resources. 
4It also indicates that the cost of adjustment to transitory 
external shocks is in fact greater than the welfare loss caused by the 
elimination of the deficit. 
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II 
Resource transfers and unnecessary 
welfare losses 
In the last five years the Latin American peoples 
have suffered and continue to suffer a dramatic 
adjustment. Thus, in the 1982/1985 period they 
have generated enormous surpluses on their 
trade accounts, transferring to the creditor 
countries US$ 105 billion (see table 1). 
It is evident that this adjustment has been 
very onerous, since each dollar transferred 
abroad is a dollar of goods and services that the 
countries of the region have not consumed or 
invested. But the really tragic aspect is that it has 
been, and still is, unnecessarily costly, from the 
standpoint of both the logic of adjustment itself 
and the development potential of the Latin 
American countries. What is more, although this 
process has been considered quite an 
achievement in the North (and why not? —since 
from their point of view the results might not 
only have been much less satisfactory, but their 
own economies are prospering independently of 
the fate of the developing countries), the Latin 
American peoples have found themselves 
obliged to pay their bills many times over. 
Table 1 
LATIN AMERICA: GLOBAL SUMMARY OF BALANCE OF 
PAYMENTS AND EXTERNAL DEBT 
(Millions of dollars) 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Trade balance 
Net interest payments 
Net factor service 
payments 
Balance on current 
account 









Net external debt 
1985 
-8 480 -6 211 -10 121 -12 613 -1 354 27 003 33 969 
-6 738 -9 630 -13 916 -22 135 -33 627 -30 967 -32 901 
-9 912 -13 462 -18 031 -27 552 -39 597 -34 630 -35 876 
-18 392 -19 673 -28 152 -40 165 -40 951 -7 627 -1907 
26 208 29 092 29 546 37 287 19 881 3 220 10 206 
25 837 22 844 28 275 46 465 34 545 19 230 12 000° 
374 6 251 1 271 -9 178 -14 664 -16 010 -1 794" 
7 757 9 787 2 231 -1843 -19 191 -3 755 8 298 
15 925 15 630 11515 8 735 -19 716 -31410 -25 670 
158 633 189 950 230 235 287 709 330 702 350 123 366 493 












Source: ECLAC's data bank. 
" Estimates. 
Includes private unrequited transfers. 
includes official unrequited transfers. 
Includes errors and omissions. 
Table 2 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source! On rhe basis of ECLAC data bank and ECLAC (1985) tables 3 and 5. 
"Variation between annual averages, in percenrages. „ 
fcOne minus actual domestic product (V„) divided by potenrial gross domestic producr ÇtP), all multiplied by 100, i.e. (1 - î-)100. Potential gross domestic product was calculated from the 1950-1978 
gross domesric product growth rrend. Minus sign (-) indicates surplus. "p 
cOf goods and non-factor services. rj 
JOne minus the aaual currenr account deficit (Da) divided by the potential current account deficit (Dp}, all multiplied by 100, Le. (1 - )100. The potenrial current accounr deficit is defined 
Dp 
as the current account deficit that would be observed if the quantum of imports of goods and non-faaor services equalled its trend value, given rhe aaual values of the other balance-of-payments variables. The 
1981-1985 rrend values were calculated on the basis of the trend growth rate recorded in the 1950-1978 period The minus sign (-) indicates surplus. 
'Percentage change from December to December. 
1
 For the twelve monrhs rerminaring in the last month for which there are data available. 
*The potential current accounr deficit is positive. 
*The 1981-1985 trend values were calculated on the basis of the trend growth rate observed in rhe period 1968-1978. 
' Up to 1981 the trend values were calculated on the basis of the trend growth rate recorded in the period 1972-1978; from 1982 to 1985 the trend growth rare estimated from dara for the period 1950-1978 was applied 
JThe 1981-1985 rrend values were calculated for the period 1972-1978. 
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Indeed, whereas in 1981, after 30 years of 
uninterrupted economic development, over half 
the Latin American countries recorded 
production and employment levels above their 
respective trend values, in 1983 there were 
production gaps in all the countries of the 
region. They amounted to 18% in that year, to 
then expand to 21% and 25% in the two 
following years (see table 2).5 
The welfare losses resulting from these 
output gaps were in the order of US$ 690 to 810 
billion in the four-year period 1982-1985. The 
former figure is almost equal to, and the second 
is greater than, the actual value of the total gross 
domestic product of the region in 1985.6 For each 
dollar transferred abroad during that period 
around 7 or 8 dollars worth of production were 
*By definition, the output gap is equal to the difference 
between actual and potential levels of economic activity. In 
accordance with the conventional method, potential values of gross 
domestic product have been estimated on the basis of trend values. 
In practice, therefore, the output gap equals the shortfall between 
the actual level of economic activity and that which would have 
been achieved if the trend rate ofgrowthhadobtained.lt measures 
production unrealized or foregone and gives an indication of the 
overall efficiency of the economy. For greater details on the 
calculations given here see note 7 below and note b of table 2. 
6The lower figure was estimated by comparing actual and 
potential gross domestic product, both calculated on the basis of 
ECLAC figures on the amount of the regional gross domestic 
product in dollars at 1970 prices at the parity exchange rate. The 
difference between actual and potential product were converted to 
dollars of each year using conversion factors calculated according to 
the evolution of the United States wholesale price index. For values 
of the potential gross domestic product those of trend gross 
domestic product were used; these, in turn, were estimated on the 
basis of ECLAC data for the 1950-1978 period. (The estimate, 
carried out by the conventional method, recorded a trend growth 
rate of 5.63%.) The higher estimate of production losses was 
obtained by using the World Bank's annual calculations of actual 
gross national products in dollars and the data on the balance of 
payments supplied by the IMF and ECLAC, as well as a 
transformation of the estimate of the trend values of the gross 
domestic product. To the World Bank data were added the net 
lost. We thus find ourselves faced with a 
phenomenal wastage of resources; again, 
production losses are not inherent in the 
adjustment process. 
An adjustment so needlessly costly as the 
one suffered by Latin America may issue, rather, 
from an unwarranted dearth of foreign finance, 
i.e., from international capital market 
imperfections and procyciical lending policies by 
the international financial community; from 
deficient adjustment policies, i.e., from 
inadequate international conditionality as well 
as unsuitable economic policies in the countries 
themselves, or from both an untoward shortage 
of external finance and deficient adjustment 
policies. 
factor service payments of the corresponding balances of payments 
to obtain the actual values of the regional gross domestic product. 
(However, in the absence of World Bank statistics for 1985, a 
figure had to be obtained by multiplying its data for 1984 by the 
growth rate calculated by ECLAC for 1985.) To generate 
comparable values for the potential gross domestic product, the 
figures estimated with ECLAC data were converted by means of a 
factor of conversion to the value of the actual gross domestic 
product estimated on the basis of the World Bank data for that 
year. This conversion factor was calculated in accordance with the 
ratio observed between actual output (ECLAC data) and the trend 
values for 1982. To obtain those of the following years the trend 
growth rate estimated with ECLAC statistics was applied. The 
difference between the two estimates is mainly due to the fact that 
the World Bank calculations reflect the rises in the real exchange 
rates of the Latin American economies and therefore show an 
appreciable fall in the value of their gross domestic product 
measured in dollars, while those of ECI.AC do not take these rises 
into account and record, therefore, a less unfavourable evolution of 
the regional gross domestic product. (The ECLAC figures for the 
gross domestic product in the period 1950-1985 were obtained 
from their data bank, The data for the net factor service payments 
were taken from ECLAC (1985a, 23,30 and 31) and (1985b, 44 and 
46).) For the World Bank data see World Bank (1985,174-175) and 
(1984, 240-241). 
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III 
Causes of inefficient adjustment in Latin America 
1. External causes 
a) Scarcity of foreign finance 
The international financial community has 
shown itself reluctant to finance exceptionally 
large current account deficits for more than a few 
years, and even less disposition to do so for 
indefinite periods, even though such deficits may 
be attributable to transitory external shocks. 
Experience shows that several years of large 
deficits generally sees a retrenchment by the 
international financial community, apart from 
any consideration of efficiency from the 
standpoint of any one country or the system as a 
whole. Furthermore, although it may be highly 
detrimental to the international economy and 
the countries directly affected, such a 
retrenchment usually originates in rational 
decisions adopted by each individual bank.7 
International capital market imperfections are 
indeed responsible for a large part of the 
unnecessary welfare losses experienced by the 
Latin American countries in recent years. 
If the international economy raises 
adjustment costs unnecessarily or shows itself 
incapable of coping efficiently with shocks, it is 
the duty of governments to implement 
compensatory measures. It was precisely 
considerations of this kind that led the 
governments to create the International 
Monetary Fund. Nevertheless, over time the 
lending capacity of the IMF was allowed to lag far 
'As Sachs (1984) observes, "Recent theorizing has shown 
how such "herd behaviour" (the widespread paralyzation of new 
loans that occurred in 1982) can result from the rational decisions 
of individual banks. ...The main point of this theorizing is that each 
bank's loan decision is properly affected by the loan decisions of 
other banks. Since no bank alone can extend all of the credit that 
Mexico or Brazil needs to stay afloat, it is prudent for each bank to 
lend new money only if other banks are making new loans as well. 
Because of this interdependence of the banks' decisions, aggregate 
bank lending may stop not because the country's position has 
changed, but because each individual bank believes chat all of the 
other banks have decided to stop lending. The prophecy of a loan 
cutoff can then become self-fulfilling". (The parentheses were 
added by the author; the content is from the article cited.) 
behind world trade and international capital 
flows. 
Thus, while the ratio between the total value 
of IMF quotas and the value of world trade in the 
period 1950-1969 fluctuated between 9% and 
11%, in the 1980s it was allowed to fall to an 
average of around 4% (IMF, several years). The 
value of the quotas of the countries in the IMF, 
which largely determines the amount of 
financing to which they have access, likewise fell 
markedly in relation to the value of their foreign 
trade and capital movements. It is not 
surprising, then, that in recent years, 
characterized by enormous shocks, there has 
been an irrational rationing of foreign credit. In 
fact, confronted by an acute shortage of funds in 
relation to developing country demand for 
credit, the IMF was forced to condition the use of 
its funds to the realization of huge adjustments 
by deficit countries. Although it is true that these 
adjustments would have occurred in any case in 
view of the retrenchment of the commercial 
banks, the Fund also promoted far-reaching 
adjustments in developing countries in the 
1980s, apparently convinced that the drastic fall 
in their terms of trade was likely to be 
permanent (de Larosière, 1982). 
After 1981, as a result of the restriction of 
commercial bank credit and the lack of a 
compensatory policy on the part of the 
international financial community, the actual 
capital flow to the non-oil-exporting Latin 
American countries eventually even fell below 
its trend value, in circumstances in which the 
impact of shocks continued to increase 
appreciably8 (Ground 1986, table 7). As a result, 
8Actual long-term net foreign financing (including private 
unrequited transfers) ranged from US| 25 837 million in 1978 to 
22 844 in 1979, 28 275 in 1980, 46 475 in 1981, 34 545 in 1982, 
19 230 in 1983, 12 000 in 1984 and 6 000 in 1985. In its turn, the 
overall surplus on the capital account (including the net movement 
of short-term capital and errors and omissions) fluctuated from 
USÎ 26 208 million in 1978 to 29 092 in 1979, 29 546 in 1980, 
37 287 in 1981, 19 881 in 1982, 3 220 in 1983,10 206 in 1984 and 




















LATIN AMERICA: ESTIMATE OF THE DEFICIT (FINANCING) OWED AND THE ACTUAL 








































-7 424 -3 371 
-33 396 -24 236 
-2 932 -2 794 
-919 -1 469 






-1 411 -1 734 
-559 -385 
-1 405 -1 201 
-190 -479 
-22 917 -20 776 



























































































































the basis of statistics from the ECLAC data bank and from International Financial Statistics of the IMf 





























































































feThe warranted deficit is equal to the sum of the actual deficit and the total impact of the transitory external shocks on the balance of payments. It is also equal to 
warranted external financing (with minus sign). 
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Table 4 














a < t 
Average price of 
exports 
a < t 
Import quantum 
a > t 
Average price of 
imports excluding oil 
a > t 
Average price of oil 
a > t 
Net factor service 
d payments 
a > t 
Long-term capital 
account surplus6 
a < t 
Short-term capital 
account surplus 









— Inflation in 
industrialized 
countries 
— OPEC Ie 
— Excess net 
external 
indebtedness 
— Depressed actual 













— Natural disasters 
— Depreciation of 
United States 
dollar 
— OPEC 2C 
— Excess net foreign 
financing 
— Abnormally high 
real international 
interest rates 
— Reduction of 
credit supply by 
commercial banks 
Source: Revised version of table 2 in Ground (1986). 
"Deviation of actual values "a" from trend values "t". 
Of goods and non-factor services. 
''For an oil-exporting country the permanent income gain from OPEC 1 (i.e., the 1973/1974 oil price shack) would justify a 
positive adjustment, that is, a structural increase of domestic absorption, while the windfall from OPEC 2 (i.e., the 
1979/1980 oil price shock would call for an accumulation of international reserves. 
Includes unrequited private transfers. 
inc ludes unrequited official transfers. 
Includes the item "errors and omissions". 
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the shortage of foreign credit suffered by the 
non-oil-exporting Latin American economies in 
the years 1982 to 1985 amounted to 6 3 % , 75%, 
64% and 84%, respectively, of the amounts they 
would have needed to achieve efficient 
adjustment processes —on the assumption that 
their economies were free of rigidities and lags. 
In other words, the external credit they received 
and retained covered, in the years indicated, only 
37%, 2 5 % , 36% and 16%, respectively, of the 
effects produced by transitory external shocks on 
their balances of payments (see table 3)-9 
According to our calculations, these Latin 
American countries were obliged to effect an 
enormous overadjustment, although in 1982, as 
in 1983, a large part of the scarcity of credit was 
due to substantial deficits on the short-term 
capital account ( including "e r ro r s and 
omissions").10 Since their economies do in fact 
contain imperfections, this shortage of external 
credit was bound to lead to production gaps and 
consequently to to the unnecessary welfare 
losses that the region has endured. 
Although the oil-exporting countries 
maintained a surplus of foreign exchange during 
the early years of the 1980s the shortage of 
external finance suffered in 1985 by the Latin 
American economies as a whole reached an 
average of close on 70% of the amount they 
would have needed to cover their potential 
deficits on current account, that is, the deficits 
consistent with the maintenance of the 
economic growth rates that they achieved during 
the expansionary cycle of the postwar period 
(1950-1978), given the numerous shocks that 
their economies have endured in recent years 
(see table 4).11 All in all, considering the heavy 
falls in their import quanta caused by the 
dwindling of foreign lending and, in some cases, 
9The calculation of the effects of shocks is based on a 
systematic comparison of the actual and trend values of the 
bala nce-of-payments variables and the construction of a typology 
of shocks (see table 4). The methodology is given in Ground 
(1986). 
l0The marked negative balances recorded in 1981, 1982 and 
1983 in the short-term capital account reflected the results of 
Argentina, Mexico and Venezuela. In fact, in 1981 the negative 
balances in Argentina and Venezuela equalled 146% of that 
recorded in the region as a whole, and in 1982 and 1983 the deficits 
sustained in Argentina, Mexico and Venezuela totalled 137% and 
89%, respectively, of the regional deficits. (The cited statistics are 
from the ECLAC data bank.) 
the pronounced rise in domestic demand for 
external assets (capital flight), the production 
losses suffered by the Latin American countries 
in recent years were, in fact, considerably lower 
than might have been expected, in the light of 
the close relation that existed between the 
growth in import quantum and the growth in 
gross domestic product in almost all the 
countries during the great postwar expansion 
(see table 5). 
This result was of course decisively 
influenced by the application of domestic 
economic policies that fostered the production of 
tradeable goods and services. Thus, between 
1980 and 1985 thirteen of the nineteen countries 
for which data are available increased their 
export quanta despite the decline (of 5%) in the 
value of world exports.12 
What is more, eight of them achieved it in a 
higher proportion than the expansion (9%) of 
the quantum of world exports and six 
appreciably increased their share in the quantum 
of world exports. At the same time almost all the 
countries increased their production of 
importable goods and services. 
b) Transitory shocks or permanent shocks? 
Procyclical internat ional credit pol-
icies —that is, those which result in excessive 
expansions of credit when countries are growing 
(as occurred in the 1970s) and inordinate 
contractions when they are in recession (as is 
happening now)— also are due to errors of 
judgment and differences of opinion regarding 
the nature of the causes of current account 
deficits of the developing countries. 
In practice, the determination of the true 
nature of shocks is very problematic, since it 
involves judgments on the future course of 
"The above-mentioned concept of scarcity of external 
finance, or what we may call the foreign exchange "gap", is 
calculated on the basis of the ratio between the actual current 
account and the potential current account deficit, where the latter is 
defined as the deficit that would be observed if the quantum of 
imports of goods and non-factor services equalled its trend value, 
given the actual values of the other balance-of-payments variables. 
For further details see note on table 2. 
"The figures for world exports refer to goods only (IMF, 
several years). 
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Table 5 
LATIN AMERICA: GROWTH RATE OF IMPORT QUANTUM AND 
























































































































































Source; Prepared on the basis of data from ECLAC's data bank. 
a
 Of goods and non-factor services. 
6
 Actual accumulated variations 1981-1985. 
events. In fact, it is impossible not to make 
mistakes when it is a question of predicting 
whether shocks are permanent or only 
transitory. 
A good example of the negative results of 
mistaken predictions is provided by the case of 
the oil price shocks. Whereas the first jump in 
the relative price of crude has persisted for more 
than a decade and seems likely to remain in force 
for an indefinite period, the second has eroded 
completely. However, the international 
financial community initially judged that the 
first oil shock would be transitory and the second 
permanent and acted accordingly.13 
11
 For example, in 1981 the World Bank (1981) adopted as its 
"...central price assumption... an annual increase of about 3% in 
real terms (in the price of oil) from 1980 to 1990, i.e., from 
US$ 20.50 to US$ 42 in constant 1980 dollars. Given this long-
term perspective, the projections should remain unaffected by 
factors such as the softening of prices in mid-1981" (World Bank, 
1981, 40). (Brackets added by author.) In the following year the 
institution maintained its prediction of a significant increase in the 
real long-term price of oil, although at a lower rate than that 
forecast in its previous report (although it extended it to 1995): 
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Thus in 1974, under the aegis of the IMF, a 
special service was created for the granting of 
non-conditioned loans to help to cover the 
deficits caused by the first oil crisis. At the same 
time, by means of the so-called recycling process, 
the international commercial banks helped to 
finance the impact of the large increase in the 
relative price of hydrocarbons. In contrast, after 
the second oil crisis of 1979-1980, not only were 
no new facilities created to soften the impact of 
the new rise in the real price of oil on the 
balances of payments of the importing countries, 
but from 1982 onwards, the granting of credits 
was drastically reduced, just when the deficit 
countries found themselves affected by a new 
series of powerful external shocks. In short, 
from an efficiency point of view, the 
international financial community provided a 
generous amount of credit when circumstances 
did not warrant it and, after the retrenchment of 
the commercial banks, it did not lend a cent in 
circumstances which really called for it.14 
It also may be noted that the dichotomy 
between permanent and transitory shocks 
usually is not interpretated with due precision. 
For example, if we adhere to the strict meaning 
of a permanent change in international market 
conditions, permanent shocks are unusual from 
"After rising until mid-1981 the real price of oil fell for a period, as 
it did from 1975 to 1978; but this fall is not likely to affect the long-
term upward price trend. This trend is determined by demand and 
supply conditions, which have not substantially changed over the 
past year. ...A real increase in the price of oil of some 2% annually 
from 1982 to 1995 seems most likely..., although it is impossible to 
be precise about the trajectory" (World Bank, 1982, 34). 
14
 It should be remembered, however, that if efficiency 
considerations indicate that adjustment should take place, they also 
would call for it to be that phased in, according as the economy is 
affected by imperfections. From this standpoint, a temporary 
supply of external credit would have been justified after both oil 
crises. On the other hand, the trajectory of the international price 
of oil may not be independent of the willingness of the 
international financial community to accommodate or not system-
wide, petroleum-related current account deficits. A decision to 
cover such deficits indefinitely might prolong petroleum price 
shocks, whereas a decision not to finance them might shorten their 
duration, inasmuch as the extent of the rise in the domestic relative 
price of oil at the country level varies inversely with the degree of 
accommodation of the system-wide balance-of-payments impact of 
petroleum price shocks. Once again, a phased in but progressive 
adjustment might constitute the most efficient response, 
irrespective of whether these shocks are regarded as transitory or 
permanent. 
a historical standpoint; even secular relative 
price shocks are infrequent. 
In this connection, mainstream economists 
used to argue that there are no secular relative 
price shocks, much less permanent ones. 
Witness all the abuse heaped on Raúl Prebisch 
when he maintained, in 1949, that Latin 
American countries' terms of trade had suffered 
a secular deterioration since the 1860s and 
argued that these countries should therefore 
actively promote structural adjustments in their 
economies in order to return to their potential 
growth paths (Haberler, I960; Prebisch, 1949). 
In contrast, in the decade of the 1980s the 
developing economies are obliged to adjust to 
the impact of these shocks, frequently almost 
instantaneously. It is as though international 
shocks suddenly had become permanent 
phenomena.15 
In the light of these considerations and in 
view of the costs inevitably involved in a brusque 
adjustment process in economies affected by 
rigidities and lags, it may be that in the interests 
of efficiency virtually all external shocks should 
'^Consider, for example, the response made by Mr. de 
Larosière to a question about whether IMF conditionality was 
tightened in mid-1981: "If a country runs a balance-of-payments 
deficit amounting, let us say, to 8% of its gross domestic product 
<GDP), and if in that particular case its sustainable deficit is 
considered to be in the order of 2% of its GDP, an adequate three-
year adjustment programme would imply an adjustment of some 2 
percentage points a year in the deficit of that country. But suppose 
now, for the sake of the argument, that this same country has 
moved into a worse balance-of-payments position; for instance, a 
deficit of 12% instead of 8% of GDP because of an irreversible 
deterioration in its terms of trade and/ or because of a slippage in 
its domestic financial policies. Its long-term sustainable 
fina nee a ble position has not by the same token changed and it is 
still, in my example, at 2% of GDP. The necessary adjustment 
would imply a reduction of a little more than 3 percentage points a 
year in the course of the three-year programme. Now, ¡n such a 
situation, which in fact often happens and has occurred in 1980 and 
1981 with the worsening of international recession, the perception 
might have arisen that conditionality had tightened. But what has 
really happened is not a tightening of conditionality per se; it is a 
worsening of the external conditions of thecountry in question and 
the need for more adjustments" (de Larosière, 1982,4-5). Did the 
then Managing Director of the IMF mean to imply that the 
international recession would be a permanent phenomenon or that 
it was a result of the domestic policies of developing countries? Did 
the IMF base its policies on such premises? Moreover, in the last 
sentence of the quotation no reference is made to the need to 
distinguish between transitory and permanent shocks, rather, it is 
stated that countries should adjust when external conditions 
deteriorate. 
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be regarded as transitory and, in consequence, 
their effects eligible for temporary financing. 
Yet, transitory shocks are not uniform in 
character: they may be strictly cyclical, i.e., the 
counterpart of a past or future change in the 
opposite direction; or they may be asymmetrical, 
i.e., a change which, although transitory, is not 
and never will be the reflection of a movement in 
the opposite direction.16 
Although the deficits caused by cyclical 
transitory shocks could be sustained without 
external borrowing —through the use of the 
international reserves accumulated during the 
favourable phase of the cycle— the financing of 
deficits caused by asymmetrical shocks implies 
the accumulation of external debt. It is possible 
to envisage cases in which transitory external 
shocks require a certain degree of adjustment in 
the interests of efficiency. 
c) The shortcoming of international condi-
tio nality 
The belief that the International Monetary 
Fund's adjustment programmes impose 
unnecessary losses is widespread in developing 
countries. Although the recessionary bias of 
these programmes is basically due to the 
untoward shortage of foreign finance, the IMF's 
adjustment policies also involve unnecessary 
costs.17 
2. Domestic causes 
a) Domestic versus external shocks 
The implementation of countercyclical 
policies, during the recessionary phase of the 
cycle implies the application of countercyclical 
policies during the expansionary phase as well. If 
the domestic policy stance is instead procyclkal 
during the growth phases as well as 
expansionary during the recessionary phases —a 
pattern that more or less describes the postwar 
experience of most of the Latin American 
l6The oil crisis of 1979/1980 might be an example of this last 
type of transitory shock. 
"For an analysis of the deficiencies of IMF adjustment 
policies see Ground ( 1984). See also Williamson (1983) and Killick 
(1984). 
countries until the advent of the present crisis— 
the external debt grows progressively, thus 
weakening in the long run the country's growth 
capacity and room for manoeuvre. Such a pattern 
eventually erodes the very rationale for 
countercyclical policies, international as well as 
domestic. However, phenomena such as the 
insufficient growth of the production of 
tradeable goods and services, excess external 
indebtedness, the retrenchment of commercial 
banks and capital flight are conditioned by 
shocks emanating from the international 
economy as well as by shocks stemming from 
untoward domestic economic policies. 
Excess external indebtedness. One of the 
manifestations of the shocks deriving from 
domestic economic policies is the excessive 
expansion of the import quantum.18 During the 
1970s and up to the early 1980s numerous Latin 
American countries immoderately expanded the 
domestic absorption of goods and services (real 
domestic expenditure). Although from 1982 
onwards the reverse occurred as import quanta 
were slashed drastically the legacy of its 
inordinate previous growth remained, in the 
shape of an excess stock of external debt. 
However, these spending sprees were due as 
much to supply side shocks as to domestic 
economic policy shocks. Money (i.e., nominal) 
domestic demand can evolve independently of 
supply, but the domestic absorption of goods and 
services is necessarily the result of the 
interaction of nominal domestic demand and 
supply, including of course both domestic 
production and net imports (foreign savings or 
finance). 
The eagerness of the international 
commercial banks to fuel this prodigality —to 
finance current account deficits which, from the 
standpoint of efficiency, should not have been 
sustained— apparently reflected the banks' 
drive to adjust their portfolios after decades of 
little activity in the developing countries, as well 
as the international capital market 
imperfections that impelled bank lending to 
Latin America beyond the optimum or desired 
18Here the words excessive and excess and their synonyms 
refer to the difference between actual and trend values of the 
variables in question. 
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amount (Devlin, 1984a and 1984b; Sachs 
1984).iy 
In any event, "takes two to tango". The 
responsibility for the immoderate expansion of 
domestic spending or the untoward 
postponement of adjustment devolves as much 
on the international commercial banking 
community —which lent the money— as on the 
countries themselves —which borrowed it. 
From this observation issues the criterion of 
shared responsibility (or, as Prebisch said, 
"shared irresponsibility"). 
Although domestic policy shocks as well as 
permanent external shocks do call for 
adjustment, the burden inherited through not 
having adjusted to these shocks in the past —i.e., 
the (net) interest payments generated by the 
corresponding excess (net) external debt— is a 
joint responsibility. Consequently, half these 
interest payments should be financed by the 
international banks.20 
As this has not occurred, the Latin American 
nations have found themselves faced with the 
dilemma of enduring an even more intensive 
adjustment or failing to completely fulfil their 
foreign commitments. In the event, the 
countries have chosen to make an effort 
disproportionate to their responsibility in the 
handling of the debt problem. Indeed, after 
sharing the financing of interest payments with 
external sources in 1982, the region as a whole 
financed 89% of its interest payments in 1983, 
78% in 1984 and 89% in 1985 (see table 1). 
The reduction of foreign financing. A fall in 
the net inflow of long-term capital below trend, 
may well be a response to domestic policy 
shocks. Yet, as the pervasiveness of the 
curtailment of foreign finance in recent years 
suggests, factors beyond the purview of 
developing countries frequently exercise more 
influence than do their domestic policies on the 
l9A patent example of the procyclical bias of the 
international capital market was the overindebtedness of the oil-
exporting countries during this period. 
20Note that excess net external indebtedness may reflect 
policy responses to the impact of transitory external shocks. For 
efficiency's sake one hundred per cent of the corresponding net 
interest payments should be financed (first with excess holdings of 
international reserves and when these are exhausted with foreign 
credit). 
decisions of the international financial 
community to lend them money. Even if "a 
decline in the net inflow of capital below trend 
were to coincide with domestic policy shocks or a 
permanent deterioration in external conditions, 
the fact is that this decline necessarily involves a 
greater adjustment than that required by such 
shocks per se. Indeed, unless the country has 
access to additional foreign financing, shocks 
inevitably entail a proportionate reduction in the 
current account deficit. Hence, from the 
efficiency standpoint, whether a fall in the 
surplus on the long-term capital account below 
trend warrants compensatory foreign financing 
from sources such as the IMF depends solely on 
whether the fall is considered transitory or 
permanent.21 
Capital flight. When external shocks are 
large domestic demand for foreign financial 
assets may surpass trend, in spite of the absence 
of domestic policy shocks.22 Nevertheless, when 
capital flight is unleashed domestic policies 
cannot be considered adequate however much 
the phenomenon may have been ignited by 
transitory external factors. Indeed, while 
developing countries cannot always obtain all 
the foreign finance they need, even if their 
domestic policies are adequate, they can certainly 
halt capital flight by applying appropriate 
exchange rate, fiscal and monetary policies. 
The Latin American nations can hardly 
expect the international financial community to 
provide them with an adequate volume of credit 
21
 However, if shocks emanate from domestic policies or the 
economy has been subject to permanent external shocks, the 
provision of foreign financing to compensate for a temporary 
decline in the net inflow of long-term capital below trend should be 
made to depend on the implementation of appropriate domestic 
policies. 
22In fact, as Carlos Diaz-Alejandro (1984) observed: "Both 
capital flight and tax evasion by foreigners are openly encouraged 
by private and public actors in OECD countries. During 1984 there 
were reports that United States banks were engaged in high-
powered campaigns to sell their certificates of deposit in several 
Latin American countries. The United States Treasury has 
announced plans to sell securities to foreign investors, who will not 
have to reveal their names; new regulations will also allow United 
States corporations to sell bearer bonds overseas without resorting 
to offshore subsidiaries, and security concerns hope to sell to 
overseas investors bearer bonds backed by United States Treasury 
bonds. Behaviour not permitted to domestic citizens is encouraged 
among foreigners ... Increasingly, the international system offers 
Latin American middle and upper classes comfortable possibilities 
for capital and personal exit..." 
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if their own citizens are sending their savings 
out of the region. And even if the international 
commercial banks were willing to finance capital 
flight, the accumulation of external debt for this 
purpose, like the accumulation of external debt 
to compensate the balance-of-payments effects 
of any domestic policy shock, are expedients 
which in the long run are more costly than the 
alternative of adjustment. In consequence, when 
capital flight occurs adjustment, rather than 
foreign finance, should be resorted to. 
b) Domestic structural and institutional 
imperfections 
The inefficient adjustment of the Latin 
American economies also is rooted in domestic 
structural and institutional defects, which 
hamper the full employment of their productive 
factors, impart an inflationary bias to the price 
level and help to create a chronic dependence on 
external credit. In contrast to excess external 
indebtedness, these imperfections constitute a 
legacy attributable solely to flaws, in past 
domestic policies. Nonetheless, like excess 
external indebtedness, this is a phenomenon 
that can only be overcome in the medium 
and long term. Consequently, although the 
minimization of the cost of adjustment implies a 
phased process —since otherwise it will involve 
needless welfare losses— the rationale for the 
temporary financing of the impact of shocks also 
would call for the implementation of far-
reaching policy reforms designed to mitigate the 
domestic structural and institutional defects that 
help to create an overdependence on foreign 
financing to sustain economic growth during the 
expansionary phase of the cycle and to avoid 
gratuitous welfare losses during the trough of 
the cycle. 
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IV 
Proposals for reform 
1. The strengthening and flexibilization of 
the lending capacity of the IMF 
In the last five years the international financial 
community has denied Latin America transitory 
financing of the balance-of-payments impact of 
shocks and therefore time for an efficient 
adjustment. From this incongruency issues, from 
a normative point of view, a large part of the 
needless welfare losses suffered by the Latin 
American peoples during recent years. 
An ideal reform of the international capital 
market would reconcile the supply of resources 
available to the IMF, plus those it catalyzes from 
other sources, with the changing international 
demand for liquidity, and harmonize the amount 
of resources to which each country has access 
with each country's changing demand for 
foreign finance, on the basis of the efficiency 
criterion. 
It is evident that this reform would involve 
an enormous increase in the IMF's lending 
capacity and therefore in the quotas of the 
institution's member countries. For instance, if 
we generalize from the 1982-1985 experience of 
the non-oil-exporting Latin American countries 
in respect of the effect on their balances of 
payments of the transitory external shocks and 
the capacity shown by the IMF to catalyze and 
mobilize resources from the rest of the 
international financial community for these 
countries (see table 3), we would be speaking of 
an increase of over 350% in IMF quotas. This 
would have an approximate gross cost of over 
US$ 8 billion for the member countries of the 
Fund.23 In this connection, it may be recalled that 
our estimates of the unnecessary welfare losses 
suffered by Latin America in the 1982-1985 
period ranged from US$ 690 to 810 billion. 
"This estimate was calculated from data on the gross cost 
that the latest rise (45%) in the quotas of the IMF agreed in 
December 1983 would signify for the United States (Cline, 1983). 
It should be noted that if the rise in the quotas results in a higher 
level of world activity, its net cost is proportionately reduced. 
It must be recognized, however, that to 
offset the imperfections of the international 
capital market it is not feasible to transform the 
efficiency criterion into a fixed international 
policy rule. Indeed, it is impossible to determine 
beforehand or even in the event the magnitude 
that the IMF's financing capacity should attain in 
order to avoid needlessly costly adjustments for 
the simple reason that it is impossible to predict 
which international shocks will be strictly 
cyclical, i.e., the counterpart of a movement in 
the opposite direction; which will be transitory 
but not cyclical, and which will be permanent. 
In view of the extent of our ignorance and 
the costs that any brusque adjustment 
necessarily entails for the imperfect economies 
of the real world, our proposal is that all current 
account deficits attributable to external shocks 
should be financed for a certain period, 
irrespective of whether they are considered 
transitory or permanent. In other words, the 
(external) shocks themselves would determine 
the degree of potential access of each country to 
compensatory external finance, rather than the 
system of fixed quotas set without regard to the 
potential size of shocks which is currently used 
in the IMF. 
Said period might be fixed on the basis of the 
average historical duration of cyclical troughs in 
the international economy; the ideal would be to 
take into account the optimum velocity of 
adjustment of each economy. Every deficit 
country would have the option of phasing in its 
adjustment in the course of this period, that is, of 
being assured, let us say during a four-year 
period, of compensatory foreign finance 
equivalent, for example, to 80% of the total 
impact of the external shocks in the first year, 
60% in the second, 40% in the third and 20% in 
the last. A more gradual process would be 
justified in the case of economies that could show 
that they were not in a position to adjust 
themselves efficiently within the conventional 
period. 
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The implementation of this reform would 
foster efficiency, at the country level by reducing 
the cost of adjustment and discouraging 
domestic policy shocks, since no external finance 
would be provided to compensate the impact of 
such shocks. At the same time it would tend to 
limit the accumulation of external debt to 
finance the impact of mutations in international 
market conditions and thereby would improve 
the performance of the developing economies in 
the long run. It likewise would allow the 
achievement of international levels of activity 
and trade higher than otherwise would be 
obtained; in particular, it would tend to diminish 
the intensity and shorten the duration of certain 
international shocks, such as the fall in 
commodity prices and interruptions in private 
capital flows to deficit countries. 
Although it is equally impossible to calculate 
with any precision the lending capacity that the 
IMF would need to implement this reform, since 
the future magnitude of external shocks cannot 
be forecast with any certainty, it is possible to 
estimate in the event the influence they exercise 
on the balance of payments. The other element 
in our proposal for reform of current 
international adjustment policy is, then, the 
endowment of the IMF with a mechanism that 
will enable it to mobilize resources according to 
the changing magnitude of external shocks 
rather than to a rigid formula. 
In this connection, the new adjustment 
programme agreed to between the Government 
of Mexico and the International Monetary Fund 
represents a very encouraging advance. Indeed, 
the programme proposed by the Mexican 
authorities to the IMF in their Letter of Intent of 
22 July 198624 is designed in function of an 
economic growth target, the magnitude of future 
shocks and the capacity of the economy to adjust, 
instead of in function of a fixed supply of foreign 
finance, as had been customary in traditional IMF 
adjustment programmes. Hence the financing 
needs, as well as the performance criteria and 
policy understandings, are made subject to the 
trajectory of the price of oil, to an estimate of the 
"Published in lixcelsior on 28 July of that year. It was 
announced on 29 September that the adjustment programme and 
the amounts of financing had been ratified by the IMF and the 500 
creditor banks of Mexico. 
economy's capacity to sustain cutbacks in 
absorption without production losses, and to the 
evolution of economic activity in relation to the 
target for its recovery. As a result of a more 
effective use of the considerable bargaining 
power Mexico possesses thanks to the enormous 
size of its external debt and the interdependence 
of the United States and Mexican economies, the 
country is slated to obtain credit in the amount of 
at least US$ 12 billion between August 1986 and 
December 1987 compared with the US$ 4 
billion originally proposed by the international 
financial community. What is more, if the 
international price of oil should fall below nine 
dollars a barrel, provision is made for additional 
credit to finance fully its balance-of-payments 
effects up to a sum of US$ 2.5 billion for three 
quarters. Subsequently, the economy would 
adjust gradually to the effects of any such decline 
in the price of hydrocarbons over the course of 
five quarters. Conversely, if the international 
price of oil were to exceed 14 dollars a barrel, the 
amount of external finance would be reduced in 
proportion to Mexico's increased income from 
petroleum exports. Furthermore, the supply of 
credit would be raised automatically by US$ 500 
million to cover a supplementary public 
investment programme should the economic 
growth target not be achieved in the first half of 
1987. Finally, by virtue of the priority assigned to 
the recovery of economic activity, no attempt 
will be made to stabilize and adjust the economy 
simultaneously. 
A precedent thus has been established by the 
international financial community for the use of 
a normative, efficiency-based approach to deal 
with adjustment. Nevertheless, the extension of 
this new international policy approach to 
adjustment in all the deficit countries will 
require a persistent campaign to institutionalize 
it through the introduction of reforms of the 
type indicated. Otherwise, after the spectre of a 
Mexican moratorium fades, the international 
financial community will go back to the 
traditional approach. 
2. The adaptation of domestic 
adjustment policies 
Without prejudice to the need for systemic 
reforms in the international capital market 
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geared to minimize the avoidable costs of the 
adjustment process, the gratuitous welfare losses 
suffered by the deficit countries also could be 
reduced with appropriate reforms in domestic 
adjustment policies, both in those promoted by 
the international financial institutions and those 
implemented through the initiative of the 
countries themselves. 
In this connection, significant and positive 
innovations have taken place in the content and 
mix of economic policies implemented in some 
recent adjustment programmes in which the 
IMF has participated. Thus in 1984 the Fund 
approved —apparently for the first time— a 
countercyclical fiscal policy for the second year of 
a Stand-by Arrangement with the Government 
of Chile (10 January 1983). Indeed, the target for 
the non-financial public sector deficit was raised 
from the figure of 2.3% of gross domestic 
product actually registered in 1983 to 4.5% of 
projected GDP in 1984, with a provision for a 
further increase equal to 0.8% of GDP if 
additional external finance equivalent to that 
amount were to materialize. In contrast, the IMF 
traditionally has insisted that the adjustment 
programmes it supports include major cutbacks 
in the non-financial public sector deficit in 
relation to gross domestic product. In September 
1984, during the course of this same Stand-by 
Arrangement, the IMF also accepted —once 
again, apparently for the first time— a rise in 
tariffs from 20% to 35% of the CIF value of 
imports, despite the fact that the measure 
appeared to run contrary to one of the articles of 
the agreement. 
Elsewhere, towards the middle of 1985 the 
IMF agreed to the introduction of generalized 
price controls in one of the adjustment 
programmes in which it was participating, 
namely the Stand-by Arrangement concluded 
with the Argentine Government (28 December 
1984). The acceptance of this measure, which 
aimed at reconciling the popula t ion ' s 
inflationary expectations with the authorities' 
monetary targets in order to minimize the 
recessionary effect of the stabilization plan 
(Austral Plan), marked another policy precedent 
in IMF-supported adjustment programmes. 
Finally, the adjustment programme agreed 
to between the Mexican Government and the 
IMF also contains innovations in the economic 
policy field. In effect, it combines a new 
approach to financial programming with 
structural and institutional reforms. Moreover, 
in contrast with traditional adjustment 
programmes, it does not seek to stabilize and 
adjust the economy simultaneously. In 
consequence, and thanks to the compensatory 
mechanisms agreed to as regards foreign 
financing, the targets for the criteria of 
execution will be provisional, depending on oil-
price variations and the evolution of the gross 
domestic product, instead of fixed, as had been 
the norm. Moreover, a decidedly countercyclical 
exchange rate policy will continue to be applied. 
At the same time work will go forward on the 
structures of production and expenditure 
through far-reaching reforms of trade and 
taxation policy, the reduction and rationalization 
of the public sector and the active promotion of 
direct foreign investment. Finally, the target for 
the non-financial public sector deficit for 1987, 
representing 10% of projected gross domestic 
product, implies a reduction of no more than 
three percentage points from the estimated 1986 
figure. This modest reduction is in line with the 
decision not to attempt to stabilize the price 
level while the economy is adjusting. For 
targeting purposes the effect of inflation on 
interest payments on the government 's 
domestic debt will be excluded from the non-
financial public sector deficit —another first for 
an IMF-supported adjustment programme. 
Once again it is open to question whether 
these innovations constitute a new approach to 
adjustment policy, involve conjunctural 
deviations from the traditional paradigm, or 
whether they show that the IMF is in fact willing 
to adapt its policies to prevailing objective 
conditions, as it always has affirmed. On the 
other hand, they show that deficit countries are 
capable of putting over their points of view. At 
all events, there still may be room for 
improvement in the efficiency of the adjustment 
programmes sponsored by the IMF.25 
25In another article the author presents a series of proposals 
for the palliation of the recessionary bias of IMF to nationality 
(Ground, 1987). 
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There is, at the same time, ample room for 
rectifying the cyclical stance of the domestic 
policies of the Latin American countries. Indeed, 
this is imperative to the achievement of their 
growth potential. In many countries, however, 
this would not suffice to reduce within a 
reasonable period of time the gap between the 
actual and potential rates of economic growth, 
due precisely to the legacy of past incongruences 
in the economic policy, i.e., the excessive 
accumulation of external debt and domestic 
structural and institutional defects. 
It must be emphasized, therefore, that the 
criterion of shared responsibility for excess 
external debt as well as the existing untoward 
scarcity of foreign credit fully justify Latin 
America's vindication that the international 
financial community should either provide more 
credit for interest payments on the external debt 
or reduce debt service payments. The region has 
considerable bargaining power since in the last 
three years (1983-1985) it has financed 85% of 
its interest payments on the external debt 
through domestic adjustments and production 
losses. This is a much higher proportion than it 
would have to assume if the costs of the excess 
build-up of external debt were distributed 
according to the principal of shared 
responsibility. On the other hand, the rationale 
for a true sharing of the costs of the excess 
external debt, as well as for temporary external 
financing of the impact of any external shock, 
implies at the same time reforms to mitigate 
domestic structural and institutional reforms. 
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